Refugees and displaced have been, by and large, absent from recent analyses of the Arab uprisings, unless as accidental victims and consequences of violence. Analyses and debates on the reconfiguration of rights, democracy, social justice and dignity in the region suffer from a chronic methodological nationalism, which perpetuates the idea that people seek and fight for rights and self-determination solely in their national territory, seen as the natural context for achieving a full social personhood. The implication is that those who are at the margins of nation-states or who are displaced from their own original nations/territories, like Palestinian refugees, come to be twice marginalised and their predicament is made even more invisible. The idea of return as their only life project does not give justice to the complexity of their aspirations and claims that comprise the right to have rights, alongside the right to return to their lost land and properties, which could be conceived, more broadly, as a return to dignity. The implications are extremely significant and point to the need to rethink nationalism and the classic modern project of the nation-state as the only site for self-determination. Refugees' narratives and practices call for a critical examination of the classic notion that access to rights should be dependent upon belonging to territorially bound and homogenous national communities, a notion that is flawed to start with in most Middle Eastern nation-states, where structures and opportunities for power, rights, and resources reflect and reinforce complex hierarchies based on ethnic, religious, gender, and class divisions.
the old trinity of state/nation/territory -this apparently marginal figure deserves rather to be considered the central figure of our political history. 'we are happy with/like them and then we leave them and forget about them'. I want the message to reach the rich. And these poor old people who get themselves tired, who are old and dying here and they are asking 'we want to go back 'they are those who carry for you the qadiya [cause] and ism watanak [the name of your nation]. And you do nothing. Your power and your abilities get them out to reach those who need them. 4 In Homo Sacer, political philosopher Giorgio Agamben, drawing from the influential work of Hannah Arendt, argued that the figure of the refugee represents one of the most potent and dramatic embodiments of the constitutive fallacies of the modern nation-states. The refugee symbolises the bare life that lies beneath the citizen and that constitutes its foundation, and yet is excluded from rights and sovereignty and confined to a zone of indistinction or dependence on humanitarianism.
Human rights have had a specific historical function in the formation of the modern nation-state. The declaration of human rights represented the inscription of the natural life in the political juridical order of the modern nation-state. It is the fact of being born, the mere fact of being a human being, which confers in principle membership into the political community. The human being melts in the citizen figure where rights are conserved. Sovereignty is then transferred onto the nation. As Agamben puts it, the fiction lies in the idea that by virtue of being born, a subject is a holder of rights, which are attributed to the man, or derive from him. However, how to identify who is a citizen and who is not has constituted the essential political question of the modern nation-state. Indeed, already in the early 1900, many European nation-states started to enact policies of mass denationalisation or de-naturalisation of their citizens. France in 1915 denaturalised those subjects who originated from enemy countries. In 1926, the Italian fascist regime made a law denationalising those who were considered to have committed anti-Italian acts. Nazi Germany and the Third Reich took this principle to its extreme, with the notion of the protection of the German blood and honour, dividing German citizens into first and second-class citizens and introducing the idea of citizenship as something to be deserved rather than to be granted upon birth. 5 Later, through racism and eugenetics, Nazi Germany will effectively differentiate between an authentic life and a bare life, which has no political value. As Agamben remarks:
One of the few rules the Nazis faithfully observed in the course of the 'final solution' was that only after the Jews and gypsies were completely denationalized (even of that second-class citizenship that belonged to them after the Nuremberg laws) could they be sent to the extermination camps. When the rights of man are no longer the rights of the citizen, then he is truly sacred, in the sense that this term had in archaic Roman law: destined to die. 6 Between the First and the Second World Wars the refugee dramatically started to embody the constitutive contradictions of the modern nation-state. The droits de l'homme, which were the basis upon which citizenship rights were conferred, begin to be divorced from the latter and started to be used outside the context of sovereignty with the aim of protecting a bare life which comes to be expelled from, or located at the margins, of the nation-states and managed by human rights agencies. A plethora of humanitarian constructions perpetuated the separation. the political sphere of sovereignty and citizenship, contributing to reproduce the camps as biopolitical paradigms of the space of exception. 9 The "permanent temporariness" that characterises refugees' lives is a powerful reminder of Agamben's zone of indistinction. Palestinian refugees' status could be seen, at best, that of temporary citizens (Jordan) and, at worst, that of stateless subjects (Lebanon) . 10 In Jordan, Palestinians have been at times the assimilated -docilenationals, at times the "other" against which contingent and precarious national identities were historically fabricated. In Lebanon, for many years throughout the civil war and until 1989 the Tai'f agreements that put an end to the civil war, they have been central actors in drawing the past and contemporary political configuration of the country, paying a very high price in terms of marginality, death, and finally abandonment. However, this is only a partial picture. I suggest that Palestinian refugees articulate powerful critiques from below, which make them, in Hannah Arendt's terms, the potential "vanguard of their people".
12 Partha Chatterjee coined the notion "political society" to denote those new aspirations and claims that in many postcolonial contexts emerged outside, and somehow in opposition to, the earlier liberal consensus of state-civil society relations.
[. . .] the historical task that has been set by these movements is to work out new forms of democratic institutions and practices in the mediating field of political society that lies between civil society and the nation-state.
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While their idioms are still nationalist, these movements may encompass sub, post, and transnational allegiances, aspirations, claims, and solidarities. Attempting to take seriously Appadurai's urge to rethink the linguistic imaginary of the nation-state, Partha Chatterjee argues that these projects are located in an interstice between civil society and the nation-state which they may contest. Moreover, these agencies are interested in a project of democracy rather than in one of modernity or modernisation, from which they were excluded or only partially included.
Taking Palestinian refugees' narratives to their full depth, one could suggest that they are forming a "political society", composed of new claims, narratives, and political practices, which they base on a different moral ground than that of nationalism and the nation-state. Indeed, having been left out of the post-Oslo consensus of the two-state solution, refugees are urged to make new sense of their 64 years of dispossession and exile.
14 In the current predicament, nationalist narratives sound like mere rhetoric that perpetuate producing refugees as pawns and instruments, but depriving them of any real perspective of justice and agency. The starting point is refugees' bitter disillusion with the official narrative that their lack of rights was the pre-condition for return. Third or even fourth generations of Palestinian refugees in most cases still do not have basic rights and their return has never been as jeopardised and distant as it is today.
In many senses, this research builds on Rosemary Sayigh and Julie Peteet's influential works on refugee camps in Lebanon. 15 It takes the work further in two directions, a geographical and a temporal one. First it interrogates what it means for refugees to think of return and self-determination at a time of a crisis of the national project. Secondly, it tries to show, through a comparison between Jordan and Lebanon, how refugees' subjugation to specific and diverse forms of control and exception remains sadly at stake even when they became refugeecitizens of the host country in which they sought refuge.
Notwithstanding the persistent manoeuvre to reduce them to bare life, in their daily existence, refugees question their status as a mass of indistinct beneficiaries, as stateless subjects or as temporary citizens. Significantly, they defy the opposition between return and rights, which they do not see as mutually exclusive political projects. This process can be mostly observed in the ways in which Palestinian refugees' identity is retained simultaneously with practices of emplacement. In refugees' narratives and life strategies, displacement and emplacement are simultaneous projects and life strategies defying the "national order of things". 16 Refugees' imaginaries of return seem to substantiate this point. As well 14 Laleh Khalili conducted an interesting study, which looks at Palestinian refugees in Lebanon as agents, through mnemonic and commemorative practices of the rural, local, pre-exilic life as opposed to the nationalist commemorations. as a right to go back to one's properties and land, return is associated with tropes that recall pre-national and post-national meanings on self-determination. Most notably, return is seen as return to dignity, freedom, personhood where the latter is signified by being ahl el ard, the original land owners and inhabitants, a notion that is crucial in informing people's individual and collective identities and status. In this and other senses, refugees' narratives call for a critical examination of the classic notion that access to rights should be dependent upon belonging to territorially bound and homogenous national communities, a notion that is as flawed to start with in most Middle Eastern nation-states, where ethnic, religious, gender, and class divisions have created complex hierarchical structures and opportunities for power, rights, and resources. Jamila, it appears clearly, makes her statements from a precise standpoint, that of the stateless and disenfranchised dwellers of the Gaza Camp, and is directed to Palestinian elites and leadership, as well as to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Jordanian State. Jamila echoes the sentiments and dispositions of many other Palestinian refugees in both Lebanon and Jordan who, in addition to being the historical victims of Israeli ethnic cleansing, 18 are the archetypes of disenfranchised subjects fighting against exclusionary nation-states, where rights and entitlements are highly layered and hierarchically distributed according to ethnicity, religious affiliation, nationality, class, gender, and family status.
For over 60 years, Palestinians have been unable to return to their original lands and/or to obtain any compensation for their material and human losses. Indeed, Israel has adamantly refused to be considered accountable for the tragedy of the Nakba and had only been ready to accommodate, in historical Palestine, a symbolic number of first generation refugees. Simultaneously, many host countries have endorsed the idea that naturalisation and access to full rights (tawtin) and even tatwir (development) would constitute a de facto assimilation of the refugee populations and would, eventually, undermine their right of return.
However, as refugees themselves underline, in Lebanon and Jordan 'Palestinianness' has decisively shaped (and has been shaped by) nation-building processes and projects. In Jordan -a country with a large majority of Palestinians -what it means to be (or not) a Jordanian is inextricably linked with the selective incorporation and exclusion of Palestinians in the country's economic, political, and socio-cultural structures. After 1948, following the Nakba, (the catastrophe) a high portion of the ca. 900,000 Palestinian refugees sought shelter in Jordan and subsequently, during the Naksa following the 1967 occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, another high number of Palestinians were forced to flee and sought refuge in Jordan. 20 Significantly, most of these refugees were fleeing from refugee camps like Ariha (Jericho) or Balata (Nablus) that had become their homes after the 1948 expulsion. Aside from the class of Palestinian merchants who lived, since Ottoman times, in the territory denominated by the British as Transjordan, and who were immediately co-opted when the territory was given the status of independent nation-state by the British, most Palestinians were granted citizenship after the annexation of the West Bank to Jordan in 1950. In fact there are now many categories of Palestinians residing in Jordan, with various degrees of access to, or lack thereof, to civil rights and resources, ranging from those who hold a two or a five years valid passport, those with or without a national number (rakam watani), those with a green or a yellow travel card, according to whether they reside in the West or the East side of the Jordan river, respectively, and those with no documents whatsoever, like the so-called Gazawi. The latter's "fault" was to have sought refuge in the Egypt administered Gaza strip in 1948. By virtue of this, they were not given Jordanian nationality in the 1950s and following the occupation of the Gaza strip by Israel in 1967, those displaced in Jordan were granted a temporary residence of two years, and have since then been considered as foreigners with no access to rights in the Hashemite Kingdom. 21 In fact, these seemingly administrative categorisations, not only carry the complex political history of Ottoman and colonial projects, but were re-signified with new contradictory meanings in post-colonial and nationalist times, and have been implicated in structures of power that imprisoned people's futures for generations.
Since the 1988 disengagement of Jordan from the West Bank (fakk-el-irtibat) Palestinians with Jordanian nationality residing in the West Bank cross the bridge with a green card, a colour that constructs them as citizens of a fictional Palestinian sovereign State, and by virtue of which Jordan justifies its arbitrary withdrawal of their citizenship. 22 We heard numerous accounts of refugees who were confiscated their rakam watani, and who were given no clear or convincing explanation, except that they are This exercise of exception is justified through the rhetoric of tawtin, (naturalisation) and the need to prevent Israel from emptying the West Bank of its Palestinian residents, (as well as by reference to the Arab League veto for dual nationality for Arab nationals). In real terms, the effect of these hierarchies and categorisations is the construction and naturalisation of differences between Palestinian "nationals", and Jordanian "nationals", a category that includes some assimilated Palestinians, who are represented as legitimate members of the sovereign Hashemite Kingdom. These discourses tend to crystallise the identities of the holders into various degrees of Jordanianness or Palestinianness, seen as mutually exclusive entities, in contrast with the much more fluid and complex ways in which people themselves experienced historically these identities. As Abu Ghassan, a former Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) cadre who was jailed in Jordan after Black September, suggested: "[. Jordanisation of the public sector and the bureaucracy started to be wholesale applied. According to Joseph Massad, the aftermath of Black September constituted:
[. . .] the country's moment of implosion, which proved crucial for national redefinition. Much of the country's elite, including the PalestinianJordanian elite, backed the regime. The guerrillas were defeated and a major campaign of Jordanization, which had already been in existence before the Civil War, went into full swing after it. The other of the Jordanian was no longer the external British colonialist but an internal other, namely, Palestinian Jordanians.
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The modern national configuration, which naturalises Palestinians and Jordanians into different peoples, is subject to intense scrutiny and is often contested by refugees. In expressing his view on intermarriages between Jordanians and Palestinians, Osama, a young volunteer and dweller of the Talbyieh camp whose family is originally from Beir Sab'a, offered a lucid and poignant reflection on the material and symbolic issues supporting the hierarchies between Jordanians and Palestinians. Here the specific location of Talbyieh, an agricultural area, significantly marked the nature of refugees' relations with the local populations, composed of Bedouin families and tribal landowners who hired Palestinians as land workers in the early stages of their arrival.
There is not much intermarriage between people from the mukhayyam and Jordanians. Us and them, we both don't want. They consider us from lower class, and I don't want to give my girl to someone who thinks that way about us. It is not us who are doing the differentiation, it is them. They are saying "we are Jordanian" [. . .] but we all know that the division between Jordan and Palestine is ardi, it is a territorial division. Jordanianness and Palestinianness became, over time, national identifications with specific, albeit diverse, meanings to people. The drama of displacement and the expulsion and oppression that Palestinians faced as an unwanted nation, together with the birth of the resistance movement, all contributed to reinforce a distinct Palestinian national identity. 25 However, there is awareness and contestation over the ways in which these identities have been naturalised and are strategically called upon to reinforce hierarchies and legitimise exclusion and discrimination. Abu Ahmad, a shopkeeper we interviewed in the Hittin camp, provided us with a very compelling and symbolic example about the ways in which Jordanians differentiated the Palestinians to exclude them from the Army: "When they recruited for the army, they showed an onion to them and asked them to say what it was. Those who said basala were Palestinians and did not get into the army, those who said ibsala were Jordanian Bedouins, those they took into the army." The story, which may be one of the many oral legends, is nonetheless strikingly evocative of how Palestinians de-sacralise these discursive constructions and simultaneously contest them as basis for their exclusion from Jordanian state-building, an exclusion that still tends to be framed through the theme of the right of return, but in fact particularly targets the poorest and the less loyal to the Hashemite Kingdom amongst the Palestinians in Jordan. Wisam, whose family was expelled from Kuwait after the Gulf war in the early 1990s and found shelter in the Hittin camp, where some of his relatives already lived, clearly conveys what most refugees we talked to widely espoused:
They do not give the raqam watani to the Gazawi. And they say it is related to nuzul haqq al-awda [the issue of the right of return]. But the Gazawi want the raqam watani not so that they give up haqq al-awda [. . .] they want it to improve their situation here [. . .] Even those who [already] have raqam watani, they don't see a relation to haqq al-awda.
The Hashemite project of assimilation and the reduction of Palestinians into an invisible political and national community is internalised by certain refugees and highly contested by others. Um Ghazi who is a Jordanian citizen, noted in the course of one long conversation: "I am Jordanian, but my origin is crucial to me [. . .] 
Hierarchies of lives in Lebanon
Most of Lebanon's recent history revolves around the presence of Palestinians. At the end of 2009, Palestinians in Lebanon represented 10 per cent of the Lebanese population and 53 per cent of the 425,640 refugees lived in the 12 UNRWA administered camps or in other areas and gatherings. 26 The 1975-1990 civil war saw a high toll of death, with Palestinians being attacked by both Israel and the Christian right wing militias. While the ingredients of the war were to do with sectarianism, class, and regional interests and interferences, at the end of the civil war Palestinians were and still are today perceived in the collective memory as those to be blamed for the shaky political and sectarian grounds on which the country still stands. The life of Palestinian refugees, especially in Beirut, is marked by vivid memory of massacres where thousands of innocent refugees, including women and children, were slaughtered. During the civil war, on 16-18 September 1982 after the withdrawal of the PLO from Beirut, the Sabra and Chatila refugees were massacred at the hand of Christian Phalangist militias protected by the Israeli army, which surrounded the camps, supposedly in retaliation for the assassination of President Gemayel for which Palestinians were held wrongly responsible. This was the first act of a prolonged "war of the camps", which lasted until 1987, a time in which Palestinian innocents would be furthered attacked by the Shi'a Amal militas backed by Syria, a war that left behind the destruction of the Beirut camps and thousands of martyrs. Seldom, a family we interviewed in Bourj el Barajneh, Sabra, or Chatila have not had a martyr buried during the war of the camps.
Since the exile of the PLO, the life and prospect of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon has progressively deteriorated. Most notably, Palestinians are today suffering the exclusion from most civil, social, and political rights and entitlements, institutionalised with the suspension of the Cairo agreements signed by Lebanon in 1969 and only recently slightly alleviated. Such discrimination and exclusion from civil and social rights is legitimised through a twofold legal and discursive expedient. On the one hand, the trap of the need for a clause of reciprocity, which is of course not possible for Palestinians in the absence of a sovereign nation-state. On the other hand, political rhetoric maintains this exclusion as necessary to avoid tawtin (naturalisation) and to ensure the right of return for Palestinians. In fact, most refugees perceptively underline that the real reasons for the ban of Palestinians from social and political rights is the preservation of a precarious sectarian 'balance', which in turn contributes to maintain Palestinians as a docile population, dependent on humanitarian aid, ultimately a class of disenfranchised subjected to exploitation and easily transformed into scapegoats in case of internal and international cleavages. Abu Ayman is one of those Palestinians lying at the bottom of the hierarchy. One of the hundreds of forgotten, invisible Palestinians abandoned after a life devoted to the resistance movement. A several times displaced and a refugee, then cast off by the departure and exile of the PLO in 1982 and finally left stateless with the withdrawal of his documents from the Jordanians, Abu Ayman, who trained as an engineer, lived his life between the West Bank, Turkey, where he studied, Syria where he joined the resistance movement, Iraq and finally Lebanon. He is one of those 4,000 non-ID refugees who came to Lebanon as a result of the exile of PLO troops or cadres from other Arab countries.
27 He resorted to sell Chinese toys on a cart in the narrow streets of Chatila camp to support his family. Abu Ayman narrated his story in his bare house in Chatila. His words were not filled with bitterness as one would imagine, but rather imbued with that profound awareness, which so often accompanies refugees' narratives, of being part of a larger, deeper, complex collective history where the single had not agency to act upon.
[. . .] During my early years in Lebanon, I was part of the resistance. I worked in journalism and civil engineering, translation, graphic design on the computer. Ten years later, I was no longer part of the factions of the revolutionary movement -so I had to resort to civil work to help my children. In reality, there is an exception to my case because I carry the Jordanian nationality so I came to Lebanon illegally. I don't have any 27 Ibid. In these two quotations, we are offered very vivid illustrations of the shifts undergone by refugee camps and/as the "nation". While in the 1960s the camp was the nation, in the sense of privileged political and symbolic sites for fashioning the nation in exile, today, with the end of the camp as an active and armed space of national resistance, the nation is a social and cultural performance and UNRWA its Janus-faced side. The nation is mainly evoked during the commemoration of the crucial dates in Palestinians' history of dispossession, such as May 1948 or June 1967. On these memorial occasions, children of the camps are dressed up with Palestinian embroidered outfits and perform scenes of the past life, the peasant life of 1948, the resistance and fighting, the martyrs and the hope for return, symbolised by the key. 30 These practices could be defined as "performances of return", and carry simultaneously a political and poetic meaning which also denote a refugee "group identity" inscribed in and across the camp.
However, socio-economic integration is enacted along with the creative retention or reinvention of a distinct camp and refugee identity. Camps like Bak'a and Wihdat today operate simultaneously as refugee camps and as urban or semi-urban neighbourhoods and represent urban focal spaces with their popular and competitive markets, shops, and social activities that attract thousands of residents also from other areas. As a dweller in Wihdat put it:
It is a city, a big city. It has a lot of people, many shops, it is life. I know every inch of Wihdat. That is why I came back to Wihdat. I see a lot of people come and go to the market. I smell the good flavours, I eat the fresh food. These things you cannot see anywhere else. Not like Shmeisani. There you don't know who lives above you. Now in Ramadan we share food between the neighbours. This is the life in the camp it is not like that outside.
The camp is a space of warmth and intimacy, characterised by a unique moral economy of relatedness and support, and yet interconnectedness and porosity are also at stake. In Jordan, many camps have extended outside the official boundaries that territorially delimit them and developed in areas in close proximity. Wissam, like many others, mentioned in this regard: "When I marry I will move to Marka. It is outside of the camp, but at the same time it is near to it."
Refugees represent this moving out not as an exit, but as a process of extending the camp beyond its official territorial borders. The camp in this perspective becomes a flexible, symbolic, and political, rather than territorial 30 See Khalili, Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine.
space. It is an identity space represented by the willingness to carry a memory and a right, and not to assimilate, as Ali's words' convey:
My grandpa had a big family. Wihdat was too small to get all families next to each other. So the camp became bigger, like an onion. We made the borders of Wihdat. The government puts it much smaller.
As evidence of the unwillingness to assimilate, refugees have adamantly resisted the persistent attempts by the Jordanian government to name the camps into hai, urban districts, as this would symbolically and politically erase their history of suffering and temporariness which is still awaiting recognition and compensation.
For a long time it was also believed that people in camps would be more linked to Palestine by virtue of their poverty and encapsulation. However, class, political culture, generation, and access to rights intersect and produce different narratives and imaginaries of return. Most notably, adhering to the right of return as a project is clearly transversal to camp and non-camp dwelling.
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Many refugees in Jordan are keen in underlining that their resoluteness to holding onto the right of return is disconnected from living or not in a territorially delineated refugee camp:
Abu Fadi, a sympathiser of Hamas from Hittin camp, for example, believes that the relation between willingness to return and leaving the camp is a rather weak one. He said with political lucidity and without hesitation: Another dweller stresses how leaving or not leaving the camp depends on having resources to do so and does not impact on the right of return:
There is no possibility to leave the camp. You need money. People want to leave. Palestinians living in Europe should also have national belief (aqida wattaniyya). It should not depend on the place you live whether you have national belief or not. It does not depend on whether you live in the mukhayyam or outside either.
For many who moved out of the camp particularly, their refugee identity and status and the right of return is embedded with and transferred onto the card al wikala, the UNRWA registration card: "If you lose your card al wikala that is like losing Palestine" it was told to us by a refugee of Hittin. Indeed, upon visiting families in both Jordan and Lebanon, the UNRWA registration card was shown to us almost simultaneously with the pictures of the martyrs. Whether it represents a passport to survival, as it is the case for the most disenfranchised, or a 31 For a compelling analysis of the weak relation between nationalism and camp dwelling in Lebanon see S.
Hanafi symbolic piece of paper stored in a box together with other "return memorabilia", the card al wikala remains central in Palestinian refugees' identities.
Lebanon: Exception as a third space
Despite the suspension and exception Palestinians in Lebanon are subjected to, emplacement and displacement stand in a dynamic relation. Bourj el Barajneh and Chatila by virtue of their location in urban Beirut have, with time, become fluid urban spaces, and developed zones of interaction with the sovereign territory and subjects. Refugees from Chatila and Bourj el Barajneh are simultaneously excluded from and included into the "sovereign" territory in hierarchical ways. For example chemists, small clinics, and opticians operate in the camps privately and unofficially, but face severe hindrances as they can only prescribe certain basic medications and are obliged to smuggle medicines in the camp from outside. As it was explained to us by a Chatila resident:
Doctors can practice inside the camp, but not outside. They rent a house, but there is no insurance (if something happens to the patient). He [the doctor] can write prescriptions for medicines then you can get this medicine inside the camp in a pharmacy, but for neurological medicines for example, you can only get it outside [. . .] a doctor needs a certain government registration number in order to prescribe this sort of medication. The ones in the camp don't have this registration, they operate unofficially.
Exception extends beyond the spatial boundaries of the camp. Palestinian taxi drivers, whether they live in the camps or not, are not able to be fully insured, they buy the plate and pay the fees to drive privately, but are not covered in case something happens. Similarly, manual workers are offered the lowest working conditions and subject to arbitrary firing with no protection. As one taxi driver put it:
Palestinians can work as chauffeur. They buy the number plate but it is very expensive. Lebanese get benefits from social security. Palestinians buy the plate, but do not get anything in exchange. A Palestinian cannot get a license as a taxi driver. So if you have an accident, you are in trouble. At the checkpoint, they usually don't do anything. There is no law! If there is no law it is much more difficult. So they might even take the number from him.
A whole system partially sidestepping the suspension and exclusion to which Palestinians are subject to emerged over the years making these camps today into relatively porous social and territorial spaces characterised by a moral economy of exchange and fluidity through markets, marriages, smuggling, emigration, and immigration. 32 The juridical-discursive apparatus of exception does not incarcerate or separate refugees as bare life but it rather ends up normalising an ephemeral space of partial, insecure, and informal entitlements for Palestinians in Lebanon. As will be shown later, it also gives birth to a grey area of interconnectedness, a lively third space of critical awareness, a standpoint from which detecting and critically uttering the aporia of the Lebanese shaky nation-state building project.
Rights and return. Return as dignity
Accessing rights is one of the major priorities of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. A unison claim can be summed up like: "We don't want their citizenship, we don't want to be Lebanese, give us just the rights!" A variation of the theme was vividly expressed by an elderly refugee from Bourj el Barajneh, who eloquently stated: "Jinsiya hiya wasila -nationality is just a means to an end. Nothing more than that." In this re-articulation of rights as something detached from national belonging and membership, the watan, homeland, maintains its centrality as the place of origin, the place where refugees "own the land" and are "ahl el ard" a notion that carries much wider and profound meanings than personal propriety or national identity. As I described earlier, being ahl el ard points, in most dispossessed refugees' eyes, to land owning which conferred personhood and status, dignity, but it also refers to belonging and identity, to family genealogy, roots, and legitimacy.
One day we had a revealing conversation with Abu Ayman about "watan" (homeland), tawtin (naturalisation), and rights. Watan is in his narrative equated to a mother, something very common in Palestinians' iconography, where gendered narratives of the nation as a fertile land, as a violated and fragile spouse or as a mother are allegorically evoked. The mother/watan, in Abu Ayman's view, can never be exchanged:
[. . .] the watan to the person is the mother. My mother may be old, she may not be pretty, and she may be imperfect. But if you ask me to replace my old mother with a younger, healthier girl, I cannot. She is my blood and flesh. My watan is my mother. The watan is a mother. You cannot replace your watan. Your real mother is your original watan. You cannot replace your watan with another, even if it provides you with opportunities and with all what you may want. I believe that tawtin, for the Palestinian people, is like cutting the Palestinians from their roots and their land, their ancestors. For me, and I believe that 90 per cent of the Palestinians in the shatat [diaspora] share my idea, tawtin would kill the Palestinian people. If you cut the roots, the tree will die. Tawtin would cut the roots of the Palestinians. Tawtin is a case of death, in the material and emotional sense. [Yet] Palestinians in the shatat hope that these states will provide humanitarian and civil rights, which will allow them to work. Abu Ayman's articulation of tawtin as death of the nation evokes his refusal of assimilation, his fear of the annihilation of Palestinian national identity, the cutting of the tree from the roots. Tawtin means being forced to accept another watan, another homeland, and this is unacceptable for Palestinians. However, Abu Ayman explains, rights could be and should be dissociated from the watan:
When you give Palestinians a nationality, you are giving them a watan. However, I find a difference in the core. So, the Palestinian who migrates to Germany, and a few years later takes the German nationality, this is not bad because it means giving him a nationality which will allow him [sic] mobility. Tawtin is in the way it is offered [. . .] it is keeping them [the Palestinians] and liquidating them into the host country -and this is unacceptable. But, giving the Palestinian in Germany or Sweden or wherever he may be, a nationality in order to ensure mobility, so he can get married and live with dignity -I don't think this is bad.
Even if a person can only have one homeland, as one only has only one mother, rights can and should still be achieved in the country where one lives. Accessing rights, according to Abu Ayman, is different from top-down tawtin.
Particularly revealing and recurring in our interviews is the distinction that refugees operate between an individual, "bottom up" strategy of life that includes accessing rights and citizenship in the host countries, and a "top-down" imposition of naturalisation and assimilation from above, a form of forced tawtin, which threatens the refugees with assimilation, disappearance, and politically disqualifies them from their right of return.
Shi'a vs Sunni Fattoush. Rethinking rights, contesting sectarianism
In Bourj el Barajeh and Chatila, most refugees we interviewed echoed the following statement by Um Muhammad: "We are sunni. The shi'ia don't want our tajnees [naturalisation], because it would create imbalance between shia and sunni." Most Palestinians we talked to in Lebanon are adamant that their exclusion from most entitlements is not about upholding their right of return, as political rhetoric maintains, but is in fact clearly tied to racism and to the wish of preserving the balance of a problematic sectarian, confessional system.
In the Bourj el Barajneh camp Samira, who acts as the director of the women's association, and other women who were present during our visit, offered an eloquent picture of how sectarianism operates in Lebanon. Fadia, from the Bourj camp, maintained: According to Fadia citizenship in Lebanon has never been about belonging to a nation: "If you had money you could buy citizenship. But today it is not like this anymore. It was more after the war of the camps. I was 21 when it happened. Now it doesn't happen anymore. Now they don't want to tajanus anyone anymore", and her friend Amal adds: "If you had any respect for yourself you wouldn't stay here. Many people think like that."
Not only belonging to a specific religious sect shapes, most notably, identities, access to resources, political positions, and kin relations. It also fuels passionate debates on food and football as Samira notes: Another young lady in the room was convinced that "In Lebanon there will never be an agreement. You have this [factionalism] everywhere -in football, in basketball, everywhere" and another woman joined the discussion maintaining that "[. . .] There are even arguments on how to make Fattoush [Lebanese salad] the Sunni versus the Shi'a way!".
The discussion acquired a more serious tone when Samira mentioned that some close members of her family converted and became Shi'a to manage through their life. Conversion, as a way to exit disenfranchisement and to access entitlements, was frequently referred to during our interviews and conversations, although there are no official data confirming this:
There are Palestinians who are becoming Shi'a. It is happening now [...] My sister in law and her husband turned Shi'a. Her husband now works for Hizbullah [. . .] In the hospitals or anywhere else nowadays everything is always just for Shi'a [. . .] There are many who became Shi'a.
In addition to the strong feeling that the negation of rights to Palestinians in Lebanon is the result of sectarian cleavages and political arithmetic, refugees' narratives make constant reference to "being used" in national and sectarian political cleavages, or of representing an easy scapegoat, all in the name of their right of return.
Fadia again expresses this widespread feeling very clearly by suggesting that even the vexed question of the impossibility for Lebanese women to transmit nationality has been framed by the government as an attempt to avoid the tawtin, naturalisation, of children and spouses of Palestinian men.
The government said that its resistance to allow women to passing on citizenship is because of Palestinians -but that's not true! Anybody could buy it [. The perception of being scapegoats, pawns used in the local, national, and foreign politics of Lebanon, also thanks to the co-optation and agreement of the factions, is widespread and is particularly poignantly expressed by Raed who is an NGO worker and very active in his camp, Chatila. He embodies the disillusion of the young generation of Palestinians with factionalism, nationalist politics as well as with Lebanese rhetoric on tawtin. Raed, whom we visited in his house on several occasions throughout the last two years, offered lucid and realistic political perspectives that shaped our understanding of internal dynamics within the camp and more widely in Lebanon. On many occasions, he denounced the corruption and the lack of accountability of the factions and urged Palestinians not to be instrumentalised by Lebanese internal politics and by Palestinians' factions' power games.
An eloquent illustration of these worries were the dynamics around the demonstration of May 2011 on the occasion of the Nakba commemoration day, when a few thousands Palestinian refugees marched to the border between Lebanon and Israel and two of them were shot. This demonstration, which was part of a global campaign was, in Lebanon, organized with the necessary logistical support of Hizbullah, which real aim, according to Raed, was to channel, control, and instrumentalise Palestinian political mobilisation for other ends, rather than genuinely supporting the Palestinian right to return. A similar episode happened when Hizbullah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers in July 2006. Again Hizbullah asked the pro-syrian Palestinian coalition, Tahalof, to send Palestinians to demonstrate at the Bab Fatima gate, to distract the attention of the Israeli army, while Hizbullah guerrillas kidnapped the Israeli soldiers at another point of the border. On that occasion, many thousands refugees from Chatila and Bourj el Barajneh went down to the demonstration and a few were shot dead. While Raed recognized that also Palestinian prisoners were exchanged thanks to Hizbullah's operations, he and other young refugees adamantly contest the ways in which Palestinians are turned into an unaware mass, used as cannon fodder, denied of political agency and equality in the political process and decision-making.
Similarly, during and after the 18 months confrontation between Hizbullah and The Future Party in [2008] [2009] 33 guns were distributed in camps in an attempt to foster Palestinians support for the Future party in the conflict. "The Lebanese army does not enter the camp, but everyone has a gun in the house. Even outside the camp some people have guns." Yet, guns have been in camps 33 The confrontation was sparked by the Government on 7 May 2008 in an attempt to seize and shut Hizbollahs' telecommunication system by The Future Party. In this quotation, Raed compellingly conveys the frustration of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, especially of the younger generation, towards the rhetoric of tawtin as expressed by the powers-that-be. As I have tried to show above, for the older generation who has seen the defeat of the resistance movement in Lebanon, who sacrificed its children and who now feels abandoned by the national leadership, the ways in which tawtin is mobilised to avoid granting Palestinians rights and dignity disclose mere racism. On the other hand, the younger generation, of which Raed is a member, shows disenchantment and disaffection towards views which, in the current climate, sound purely hypocritical and merely aiming at the self-survival of the political factions.
Ahl al ard
In this context, the imaginary of return emphasised by Umm Ghazi earlier in the paper acquires full sense. Being ahl al ard, in Umm Ghazi's terms, confers identity, belonging, legitimacy, and status. It is the original land that once provided refugees with dignity and social personhood. Return, at least for the first two generations of refugees, is therefore imagined and represented, in the first place, as a return to the land from which the Palestinians were expelled in 1948, since status and identity can never be reclaimed and achieved through return to the 1967 land. Clearly, return is not simply about national self-determination or national membership, but it is rather and mainly imagined as a re-rooting or a re-inscription into the moral economy and status that owning the lands conferred Palestinians with.
Political orientation, religious, and cultural identifications also impinge upon imaginaries of return. For Abu Fadhi, who sympathises with Hamas, return would be first to dignity, embodied by a "country" with no racism, but also to Palestine as home to the sacred Islamic holy sites, for which loss there can be no compensation:
Life in Palestine would be better. There would be a government and no 'unsuriya [racism] 
The birth of a " political society" ?
Upon meeting refugees in Lebanon, the conversation would often commence with a long description of the day. Typically, one of the women of the family would have just come back from a visit to an organization, a charity, an NGO in search for resources: "We had to take debts. There are some charitable organizations, but they only give a fourth of what is needed. Nothing more than that. NGOs give only a little, and UNRWA pays for two-three days hospital" uttered Um Muhammad when we interviewed her in her house in the Bourj camp. Other common statements would point to the ways in which docility and control are highly tied with distribution of resources and to how political parties and 34 Refugees from 1948 and displaced from 1967. organizations distribute resources in exchange for loyalty and consent: "Some of the Lebanese Islamic organizations help us [. . .] . Hamas charitable organizations help, but you need to be with them, I tried to get help, but they didn't' give it to me, because I am not with Hamas." Similarly, we hear that "The parties are still strong, because they are the only ones that actually help. But the old ones, where should they go? The parties are not interested in them."
After the departure of the PLO from Lebanon in 1982, which provided not only a political identity and a national project but also strong economic and social support and protection, humanitarian aid, political factions' conditional provisions, and remittances from relatives who managed to emigrate, became the main means of survival. Everything, from being cured to finding a job to even obtaining a place to bury a deceased requires a constant and strenuous hunting for resources, a draining activity that becomes a full-time occupation. This has become a systematised mechanism for managing and controlling affiliations and loyalties. Palestinians are obliged to resort to wasta (connections) or to beg for the right contacts, networks, charities, and NGOs, to reach the necessary amount of money to be treated or buried. Resting in peace is not to be given for granted for Palestinians, who have no automatic right to be buried in the local cemeteries in Beirut. Piling bodies on the top of each other, in the limited space available in one grave, has become common practice amongst Palestinian refugees in Beirut, while the elites and the PLO cadres, even from the Diaspora, have often secured a space in the cemetery of the martyrs, a sad and tragic continuation of their privileges during their life time.
"Everything is through wasta" explained with resignation Um Muhammad from Bourj and other common complaints composed a litany: "There are some international donors that help"; "I needed 500 dollars for an operation, but no one helped me." Of course, we also collected statements where the exception confirmed the rule. "A Fatah guy from Rashidiyya helped me, and without any wasta." And further "I don't want to be in any connection with any political party".
Other persistent narratives conveying the frustration and anger of camp dwellers revolve around the lack of proper supply of electricity and water and the lack of transparency over the destination of the fees dwellers have to pay to the factions and camp committees who control the distribution of these provisions. In addition, we heard stories from camp refugees who had to fight with the popular committees to claim their properties back, as houses' transactions are only informally registered in the camps. Outside the camps Palestinians need a Lebanese to register the property in his/her name, meaning that arbitrariness and inability to take possessions back can always be at stake, but propriety in the camp maybe similarly gloomy and uncertain.
In this context, younger generations of educated Palestinians are expressing a ferocious criticism not only towards the Lebanese juridical-discursive exception and its underpinning confessional rationale, but also towards Palestinian popular committees, the UNRWA system and the humanitarian logic. Popular committees are described as corrupted, lacking any accountability and political representativeness. Such criticism is uttered through various forms and languages, ranging from emerging hip-hop radical bands such as the Khatiba 5, now very popular across the region, to new independent grass-root organizations which priority agenda is to activate networks of support outside the humanitarian circuits. 35 This is the agenda of a small but very active organization, "People-to-People", which headquarter is the Sabra gathering and whose declared aim is to reactivate solidarity chains bypassing the humanitarian machinery altogether, a system that in their view reproduces itself and reinforces dependency rather than creating opportunities for those it declares to assist.
In Chatila, the "Refugee Dream Organization" is trying to challenge existing forms of camp governmentality and representations and to initiate alternative, democratic, and bottom-up representative bodies that can truly bring people's needs and interests at centre stage. In an interview with one of the founders of the Refugee Dream Organization it became clear that part of younger generation of the camp is not willing to put up with old forms of camp control by the factions (Tanzimat) and the committees. The latter have ultimately produced elites and secured privileges for themselves exhausting in so doing their previous political legitimacy. They became intimidating entities busy with distributing resources, controlling affiliations, and securing loyalties for their survival. The changing configurations of the camps of Chatila and Bourj el Barajneh, particularly their slow transformation into urban slums and the ensuing dynamics this entails (drug selling, violence, lack of security), together with the end of old forms of solidarities and relatedness that constituted the ethos of the camp in the past also contribute to create the feeling, among some components of the new generation, that new forms of democratic representation and bottom up political participation are needed to address the future challenges.
On the occasion of the Arafat memorial day in September 2011 in the Chatila camp, in a rare moment of self-criticism, one of the local leaders of the Popular Front avowed: "[. . .] people have no trust in us anymore, they gave us their children, they gave us their lives and we gave them back nothing." This admission does not only dramatically symbolise the end of an era, that of the nationalist resistance movement in exile and its the human losses that have never been compensated for and are rarely commemorated, but it lucidly underscores the final outcome of this era: the implicit exclusion of refugees from the two-state consensus of the post-Oslo era, which contributed to the making of refugees in Lebanon into one of the most disenfranchised national communities in exile.
powerful critique towards sectarian neo-patrimonial regimes where resources and entitlements are highly layered and hierarchically distributed according to ethnicity, religious affiliation, nationality, class, gender, and family status. They utter their frustration towards the lack of accountability and the corruption of their local leaderships, they loudly outcry the dehumanising humanitarianism to which they are confined. Furthermore, they contest the old nationalist/political space as a terrain through which scarce resources are distributed and affiliations and loyalties are controlled and managed.
Their daily practices of survival and political negotiations highlight and unfold the pitfalls of postcolonial nation-state formations in the region. In this light refugees contribute to the emergence of what Partha Chatterjee calls a "political society". They operate through a framework of democracy and self-determination that precede and overcome the modern Arab nation-state project, which they represent as imbued with serious flaws. Palestinian refugees articulate demotic narratives where discrimination, integration, rights here and now, are integrated with a right to "return", conceived as return to origin and roots, land and properties, personhood, freedom. Self-determination and dignity involve claiming simultaneously for rights to rights and right to return.
Refugees' narratives and practices contribute to the emergence of a new discourse and space of the "political" which, although saturated with contradictions or uncertainties, parallels the disillusion with modernist political formations and organizations across the region, and echoes the calls for dignity that have been so central in the Arab revolts. The urge to reconcile rights with "return" is an arena where we can see Palestinian refugees turning into a political avant-garde, highlighting the need for new democratic state/society configurations.
